Education — Non-recognition — Supper specialty MDS Course

October 10th, 2013

Education — Non-recognition — Supper specialty MDS Course — Effect of setting aside — Held, consequence of setting aside non-recognition, it would not automatically follow that direction can be issued to the Central Government to accord such a permission — Dental Council of India Act, 1948 — Section 10-A(4).

(Para 28)

Swamy Devi Dayal Hospital & Dental College v. Union of India [Bench Strength 2], Special Leave Pettiion (Civil) No. 25698/2013 (27/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 608: 2013(11) JT 600 [K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.: A.K. Sikri, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order 21 Rule 47 — Objection of execution — Modification of award of land acquisition — Differences on measurement scale — Respondent filed execution of award passed by Reference Court before ADJ — Appellant herein raised objection that one Morla is equivalent to 22 sq. yards in stead of 30 squire yards as held by the Reference Court — Reference Court as well as High Court dismissed the objection as it amounts to modification of award on merits — Held, ADJ had no jurisdiction to modify the award — If appellant had any grievance could challenge the award under Section 54 of LA Act, failure the same had no remedy — Appeal dismissed — Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Sections 18 & 54.

HELD: We have considered the respective arguments. In our view, while deciding the objections filed under Section 47 CPC, the Additional District Judge did not have the jurisdiction to go into the legality or correctness of judgment dated 9.4.2001 by which compensation was awarded to the respondent on the premise that one marla is equivalent to 30 sq. yards. If the appellants felt aggrieved by judgment dated 9.4.2001 then they should have filed appeal under Section 54 of the Act. Having failed to do that, the appellants cannot seek modification of the judgment by relying upon alleged measurement of the land for Anandpur Sahib which according to the appellants is different than the measurement of land in other areas.

(Para 10).

Land Acquisition Collector, Mohali v. Surinder Kaur [Bench Strength 2], C.A. No. 6993/2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19985/2008) (22/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 406 [G.S. Singhvi, J.: V. Gopala Gowda, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 149 — Absolving liability of insurance — Dishonour of cheque issued for premium — Intimation of dishonour to insured after accident — High Court dismissed the appeal of appellant insurance company holding that since the dishonour of the cheque issued for premium was intimated to insured after occurrence of accident, therefore, insurance cannot absolve from its liability — Challenged — Held, since the insured was intimated after the accident and just after intimation he had issued a fresh cheque in place of earlier cheque, therefore, appellant cannot be exonerated from its liability.

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Laxmamma & Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 234, Referred.

HELD: The defence of the insurance company that the policy of insurance was not valid since the cheque had been dishonoured prior to the accident would not exonerate them from making the payment of compensation. In this matter, admittedly the accident had taken place on 19.04.2000 and the cheque although had been dishonoured prior to the accident on 17.04.2000, the intimation to the policy-holder had been given by the insurance company on 26.04.2000, in view of which the insurance company cannot be allowed to contend that the policy-holder was not holding a valid policy of insurance in regard to the vehicle which met with an accident. Admittedly, the policy-holder had already issued another cheque substituting the cheque which had earlier been dishonoured.

(Para 4)

In that view of the matter and following the ratio of the judgment referred to hereinbefore, this appeal has no substance and accordingly it is dismissed. No order as to costs.

(Para 5)

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Balkar Ram [Bench Strength 2], C.A. Nos. 2159/2007 (09/07/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 430 [Gyan Sudha Misra, J.: Kurian Joseph, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Constitution of India — Articles 14 & 21 — Project displaced — Denial of similar compensation — Validity of agreement — In pursuance to earlier policy of the Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation, Nagpur, petitioners surrendered their land allotted for rehabilitation in lieu of 50,000/- fixed compensation — Subsequently Corporation offered enhanced amount of Rs.3,70,055/- to similarly situated persons who have opted earlier — Petitioners/appellants claimed equal compensation but their claim was rejected by capable authority — Division Bench of High Court affirmed the rejection holding once agreement was entered and satisfied, now appellant could not be allowed for its reopening — Challenged — Held, other similarly persons have been paid higher compensation — Agreement of Government with appellants were against public police, hence are void — High Court was not correct by affirming the rejection, accordingly set aside — Official respondents are directed to pay compassion to appellants at par with others — Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act, 1999 — Contract Act, 1872 — Section 23 — Contract against public policy — Doctrines — Theory of unconscionable contract.

Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and Anr. vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Anr., AIR 1986 SC 1571, Relied.

(Para 6, 8 to 10)

Daulat Sitaram Kodone v. State of Maharashtra [Bench Strength 2], C.A. No. 6361/2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 31367/2011) (06/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 450 [G.S. Singhvi, J.: V. Gopala Gowda, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Constitution of India — Article 14 — Divestment — Divestment of 10% equity share of CIL — Non-adopting assets valuation methodology — Plea of petitioner of PIL that non-adopting of assets valuation methodology caused undue loss to public exchequer and it was against fairness — Held, this was not a sale of assets but it was sale of equity shares — Fixing price band after following the ICDR and on taking into consideration of the relevant methodologies of valuation for sale of equity capital cannot be said that the price band so fixed was unreasonable or sale of 10% equity capital by CIL was unfair — Accordingly writ petition dismissed — Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009 — Administrative Law — Fairness.

(Paras 8 to 10)

Ehsan Khalid v. Union of India [Bench Strength 2], W.P. (C) No. 429/2013 (05/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 452 [R.M. Lodha, J.: Madan B. Lokur, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Sections 14 & 13(4) — Judicial assistance — Taking possession of secured assets — Without making recourse under Section 13 (4), effect — CJM had taken possession of secured assets of respondent guarantor on direct approach by appellant Bank — High Court set aside the taking of possession by CJM under writ jurisdiction holding that mandatory requirement under Section 13 (4) and Rule 8 was not fulfilled before approaching the Magistrate under Section 14 for judicial assistance causing loss of valuable legal right of respondent for appeal — Challenged — Held, none of the respondent had occasioned to raise objection as none had objected the demand — Appellant had filed an affidavit before Magistrate providing necessary information despite it was not necessary as the proviso making such provision was incorporated in the Act by amendment after proceedings before Magistrate — On perusal of the said affidavit, even the newly amended provision had also been complied — Though there was no material before the Magistrate to satisfy himself for contents of affidavit, but the same was not required under law on date of decision by the Magistrate — Though respondent had right to challenge his deprivation of possession by the Magistrate under Section 17 of the Act, but he had chosen to challenge under Section 226 of the Constitution — Accordingly the impugned order passed by High Court is set aside — However, it is open for respondent to secure possession back of property under law — Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 — Rule 8 — Constitution of India — Article 226 — Banking Law.

HELD: Coming to the facts of this case, a notice under section 13(2) was in fact served on the respondent for which the respondent did not choose to respond. Therefore, there was no occasion for the appellant to consider the objections as there was none of the respondent against the demand made in the said notice. It is brought to our notice that even while making application under section 14 the appellant filed an affidavit substantially providing for the necessary information contemplated under the newly introduced proviso to section 14 (1). We have already noticed that there was no statutory requirement as on the date when the application under section 14 was made in the instant case either to give such an affidavit or regarding the content of the affidavit. Nonetheless the appellant chose to give such an affidavit. A copy of which is placed before us. We have perused the affidavit and it substantially complies with the conditions stipulated in the newly introduced proviso. May be the appellant did it by way of abundant caution to avoid any litigation.

(Para 39).

However, the respondent submitted before us that there is nothing in the impugned order of the Magistrate which indicates that the Magistrate applied his mind to such an affidavit and satisfied that it is necessary to deliver possession of the secured asset to the appellant. No doubt that there is no material on record to show that the Magistrate applied his mind to the facts stated in the affidavit filed by the appellant. On the date of the impugned order the law did not oblige the Magistrate to undertake any such exercise. Apart from that we are satisfied on examination of the content of the affidavit that all the basic requirements necessary for granting the request of the appellant of delivery of the possession of the secured asset are asserted to have existed on the date of application. Therefore, we do not see any illegality in the impugned order. The appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside.

(Para 40)

In view of our conclusion on the scope of section 17 recorded earlier it would normally have been open to the respondent to prefer an appeal under section 17 raising objections regarding legality of the decision of the Magistrate to deprive the respondent of the possession of the secured asset. But in view of the fact that the respondent chose to challenge the decision of the magistrate by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and in view of the fact that the respondent does not have any substantive objection as can be discerned from the record, we make it clear that the respondent in the instant case would not be entitled to avail the remedy under section 17 as the respondent stalled the proceedings for a period of almost 4 years. It is worthwhile remembering that the respondent did not even choose to raise any objections to the demand issued under section 13(2) of the Act. However, we make it clear that it is always open to the respondent to seek restoration of his property by complying with sub-section 8 of section 13 of the Act.

(Para 41)

 

Standard Chartered Bank v. V. Noble Kumar [Bench Strength 2], Crl. A. No. 1218/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2038/2011 with Crl. A. No. 1217/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6560/2011) (22/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 540 [H.L. Gokhale, J.: J. Chelameswar, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Sections 14 & 13(4) — Taking possession of secured assets — Recourse of judicial assistance — Permissibility without self efforts — Held, secured creditor may recourse direct judicial assistance without recourse under Section 13(4) of the Act — Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 — Rule 8 — Banking Law.

HELD: In every case where the objections raised by the borrower are rejected by the secured creditor, the secured creditor is entitled to take possession of the secured assets. In our opinion, such action-having regard to the object and scheme of the Act-could be taken directly by the secured creditor. However, visualising the possibility of resistance for such action, Parliament under section 14 also provided for seeking the assistance of the judicial power of the State for obtaining possession of the secured asset, in those cases where the secured creditor seeks it.

(Para 22).

Standard Chartered Bank v. V. Noble Kumar [Bench Strength 2], Crl. A. No. 1218/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2038/2011 with Crl. A. No. 1217/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6560/2011) (22/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 540 [H.L. Gokhale, J.: J. Chelameswar, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Sections 13 & 14 — Taking possession of secured assets — Procedure and judicial assistance — Scheme of the Act — Discussed — Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 — Rule 8 — Banking Law.

Mardia Chemials Limited v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311, Trade Well v. Indian Bank, 2007 CriLJ 2544, Indian Overseas Bank v. M/s. Sri Aravindh Steels Ltd., AIR 2009 Mad. 10, Referred.

HELD: One of the professed purposes sought to be achieved by the enactment as evidenced by the Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill is as follows:- “….Further, unlike international banks, the banks and financial institutions in India do not have power to take possession of securities and sell them. Our existing legal framework relating to commercial transactions has not kept pace with the changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms. This has resulted in slow place of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting levels of non-performing assets of banks and financial institutions.”

(Para 14)

Section 13(1) enables the secured creditor to enforce a security interest which such creditor has in a secured asset without intervention of the Court or Tribunal.

(Para 15)

Sub-section (2) authorises the secured creditor to exercise any of the rights under sub-section (4).

(Para 16)

It can be seen from the said sub-section that for the secured creditor to take possession of the secured assets, the following conditions must be satisfied: (i) That there must be a security agreement which creates the liability of the borrower to make repayment to the secured creditor of the secured debt, (ii) The secured creditor is required to demand the borrower by notice in writing to discharge the full liability within a period of 60 days from the date of the notice.

(Para 17)

Sub-section (3) stipulate that such notice shall give the details of (i) the amount payable by the borrower (ii) the interest in the secured asset intended to be enforced by the secured creditor. Sub-section (4)[9] provides for various measures which can be resorted to by the secured creditor in order to recover his debt. Such measures are (1) taking possession of the secured asset or (2) taking over the management of the business of the borrower. The secured creditor is also given the right either to make a further assignment of his interest or lease out the secured assets or sell the same in order to realise his debt. Such right of the secured creditor is hedged with limitations/safeguards designed to protect interest of the borrower so that the secured creditor may not abuse his rights i.e. except to take a possession of the property and alienate the same only to the extent necessary to realise the actual amount due to him.

(Para 18)

Section 13, as originally enacted, did not contain any provision for consideration of objections (if any) the borrower may have to the demand made under sub-section (2).

(Para 19)

Parliament introduced sub-section 3A by Act 30 of 2004, which now provides for consideration of the objections, if any raised by the borrower. By definition under section 2(f) of the Act a borrower includes the guarantor of the debt.

(Para 20)

Section 3A further provides that if the secured creditor reaches a conclusion that the objections raised by the borrower are not acceptable or tenable, the creditor shall communicate the reasons for non-acceptance of the objections within a period of 15 days. The proviso to the said sub-section declares that the rejection of the objections does not confer any right on the borrower to resort to the proceedings, contemplated either under section 17 or 17A. We may indicate here both sections 17 and 17A afford an opportunity to the borrower to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal or (in the cases of Jammu & Kashmir) the concerned District Court against any measure taken under section 13(4).

(Para 21)

In our opinion, such action-having regard to the object and scheme of the Act-could be taken directly by the secured creditor. However, visualising the possibility of resistance for such action, Parliament under section 14 also provided for seeking the assistance of the judicial power of the State for obtaining possession of the secured asset, in those cases where the secured creditor seeks it.

(Para 22).

Under the scheme of section 14, a secured creditor who desires to seek the assistance of the State’s coercive power for obtaining possession of the secured asset is required to make a request in writing to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate within whose jurisdiction, secured asset is located praying that the secured asset and other documents relating thereto may be taken possession thereof.

(Para 23)

Standard Chartered Bank v. V. Noble Kumar [Bench Strength 2], Crl. A. No. 1218/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2038/2011 with Crl. A. No. 1217/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6560/2011) (22/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 540 [H.L. Gokhale, J.: J. Chelameswar, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Section 14(1) — Taking possession of secured assets — Judicial assistance — Required satisfaction of Magistrate — Held, it is necessarily requires that the Magistrate to examine the factual correctness of the assertions made in an affidavit, but not the legal niceties of the transaction — Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 — Rule 8 — Banking Law.

HELD: The satisfaction of the Magistrate contemplated under the second proviso to section 14(1) necessarily requires the Magistrate to examine the factual correctness of the assertions made in such an affidavit but not the legal niceties of the transaction. It is only after recording of his satisfaction the Magistrate can pass appropriate orders regarding taking of possession of the secured asset.

(Para 27)

Standard Chartered Bank v. V. Noble Kumar [Bench Strength 2], Crl. A. No. 1218/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2038/2011 with Crl. A. No. 1217/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6560/2011) (22/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 540 [H.L. Gokhale, J.: J. Chelameswar, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Sections 17, 14 & 13(4) — Appeal — Possession by judicial assistance — Accrual of right — Plea that secured creditor cannot recourse judicial assistance without making recourse under Section 13 (4), otherwise it deprives valuable legal right of the borrower/guarantor of his appeal — Held, nothing is bad in law by direct recourse of judicial assistance as right to appeal accrue to the borrower when secured asset is handed over to secured creditor by the judicial authority — Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 — Rule 8 — Banking Law.

HELD: Section 14 authorises the Magistrate only to take possession of the property and forward the asset along with the connected documents to the borrower. Therefore, the borrower is always entitled to prefer an “appeal” under section 17 after the possession of the secured asset is handed over to the secured creditor. Section 13(4)(a) declares that the secured creditor may take possession of the secured assets. It does not specify whether such a possession is to be obtained directly by the secured creditor or by resorting to the procedure under section 14. We are of the opinion that by whatever manner the secured creditor obtains possession either through the process contemplated under section 14 or without resorting to such a process obtaining of the possession of a secured asset is always a measure against which a remedy under section 17 is available.

(Para 29)

Standard Chartered Bank v. V. Noble Kumar [Bench Strength 2], Crl. A. No. 1218/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2038/2011 with Crl. A. No. 1217/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6560/2011) (22/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 540 [H.L. Gokhale, J.: J. Chelameswar, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Sections 17, 14 & 13(3A) — Appeal — Taking possession of secured assets — Accrual of right — Held, right to appeal to borrower or guarantor accrues when he deprives the possession of secured assets by Magistrate — Banking Law.

HELD: It can be noticed from the language of the proviso to section 13(3A) and the language of section 17 that an “appeal” under section 17 is available to the borrower only after losing possession of the secured asset. The employment of the words “aggrieved by………………..taken by the secured creditor” in section 17(1) clearly indicates the appeal under section 17 is available to the borrower only after losing possession of the property. To set at naught any doubt regarding the interpretation of section 17, the proviso to sub-section (3A) of section 13 makes it explicitly clear that either the reasons indicated for rejection of the objections of the borrower or the likely action of the secured creditor shall not confer any right under section 17.

(Para 30)

The same principle is re-emphasised with the newly added explanation in section 17(1) which came to be inserted by Act No.30 of 2004.

(Para 31)

Standard Chartered Bank v. V. Noble Kumar [Bench Strength 2], Crl. A. No. 1218/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2038/2011 with Crl. A. No. 1217/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6560/2011) (22/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 540 [H.L. Gokhale, J.: J. Chelameswar, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 — Rule 8 — Possession of secured assets — Judicial assistance — Requirement to follow Rule 8 — High Court vide impugned order holding that even in recourse of judicial assistant compliance of provisions of Rule 8 is mandatory — Challenged — Held, such construction by High Court is erroneous — The functioning of Magistrate is structured by Cr.P.C. — For illustration principle can be taken from Section 83 of the Code for attachment and taking possession and further appointment of receiver of the property under Order 40 Rule 1 of the CPC — Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Section 14 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 83 — Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order 40 Rule 1 — Banking Law.

HELD: We are of the opinion that the High Court clearly erred in recording such a conclusion. The language of Rule 8 does not demand such a construction. On the other hand, a Magistrate whose functioning is structured by the Code of Criminal Procedure is required to act in accordance with the provisions of the said code unless expressly ordained otherwise by any other law. It is not a case that Cr.P.C. never prescribed for the procedure to be followed by the Magistrate in a case where the Magistrate is required to take possession of property. For example, under section 83 of the Code, a criminal Court is authorized to attach the movable or immovable property or both belonging to a proclaimed offender. Sub-sections (3) and (4) to section 83 specifically provide that once an order of attachment under sub-section (1) is made by the criminal Court, the property which is the subject matter of such attachment shall either be seized or taken possession of as the case may be depending upon the fact whether the property is movable or immovable. Both the sub-sections contemplate the appointment of receiver. It is declared under sub-section (6) that the powers, duties and liabilities of a receiver appointed under section 83 are the same as those of a receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Order XL of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the appointment of the receiver. It can also be noticed from Rule (1) that the power of the Civil Court to appoint a receiver could be exercised either before or after passing of the decree.

(Para 34)

Therefore, there is no justification for the conclusion that the receiver appointed by the Magistrate is also required to follow Rule 8 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002.

(Para 35)

Standard Chartered Bank v. V. Noble Kumar [Bench Strength 2], Crl. A. No. 1218/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2038/2011 with Crl. A. No. 1217/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6560/2011) (22/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 540 [H.L. Gokhale, J.: J. Chelameswar, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 — Rule 8 — Appointment of receiver — Possession of secured assets — Requirement to follow Rule 8 — Held, appointment of receiver is governed by Rules of CPC and Rule 8 of Security Interest Rules are not applicable — Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order 40 Rule 1 — Banking Law.

HELD: The procedure to be followed by the receiver is otherwise regulated by law. Rule 8 provides for the procedure to be followed by secured creditor taking possession of the secured asset without the intervention of Court. Such a process was unknown prior to the SARFAESI Act. So, specific provision is made under Rule 8 to ensure transparency in taking such possession. We do not see any conflict between different procedures prescribed by law for taking possession of the secured asset. The finding of the High Court in our view is unsustainable.

(Para 35).

Standard Chartered Bank v. V. Noble Kumar [Bench Strength 2], Crl. A. No. 1218/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2038/2011 with Crl. A. No. 1217/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6560/2011) (22/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 540 [H.L. Gokhale, J.: J. Chelameswar, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 — Rule 8 — Possession of secured assets — Application of Rule 8 — Appropriate stage for — Held, there are three modes of securing possession of secured assets by the secured creditor — Rule 8 apply when assets goes in the hand of secured creditor for preservation, valuation and sale of the secured assets — Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Sections 13 & 14 — Banking Law.

Mardia Chemials Limited v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311, Referred.

HELD: Thus, there will be three methods for the secured creditor to take possession of the secured assets:- (i) The first method would be where the secured creditor gives the requisite notice under rule 8(1) and where he does not meet with any resistance. In that case, the authorised officer will proceed to take steps as stipulated under rule 8(2) onwards to take possession and thereafter for sale of the secured assets to realise the amounts that are claimed by the secured creditor; (ii) The second situation will arise where the secured creditor meets with resistance from the borrower after the notice under rule 8(1) is given. In that case he will take recourse to the mechanism provided under section 14 of the Act viz. making application to the Magistrate. The Magistrate will scrutinize the application as provided in section 14, and then if satisfied, appoint an officer subordinate to him as provided under section 14 (1)(A) to take possession of the assets and documents. For that purpose the Magistrate may authorise the officer concerned to use such force as may be necessary. After the possession is taken the assets and documents will be forwarded to the secured creditor; and (iii) The third situation will be one where the secured creditor approaches the Magistrate concerned directly under section 14 of the Act. The Magistrate will thereafter scrutinize the application as provided in section 14, and then if satisfied, authorise a subordinate officer to take possession of the assets and documents and forwards them to the secured creditor as under clause (ii) above.

(Para 36).

In any of the three situations, after the possession is handed over to the secured creditor, the subsequent specified provisions of rule 8 concerning the preservation, valuation and sale of the secured assets,, and other subsequent rules from the Security Interest (Enforcement) rules, 2002, shall apply.

(Para 37)

Standard Chartered Bank v. V. Noble Kumar [Bench Strength 2], Crl. A. No. 1218/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2038/2011 with Crl. A. No. 1217/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6560/2011) (22/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 540 [H.L. Gokhale, J.: J. Chelameswar, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Constitution of India — Articles 226 — Writ — Possession of secured assets by Magistrate under Section 14 of SARFAESI — Maintainability — Held, appropriate remedy against deprivation of possession to borrower/guarantor of his secured assets is filing appeal rather than to challenge it under writ jurisdiction — It is immaterial whether secured creditor approach the Magistrate directly or after recourse under Section 13(4) — Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Sections 17 & 14 — Practice and Procedure — Maintainability of writ.

(Para 41)

Standard Chartered Bank v. V. Noble Kumar [Bench Strength 2], Crl. A. No. 1218/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2038/2011 with Crl. A. No. 1217/2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6560/2011) (22/08/2013), 2013(10) SCALE 540 [H.L. Gokhale, J.: J. Chelameswar, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 2(28) — Plying a Jugaad (unregistered assembled vehicle) — Prohibitory Circular by Central Government — Non-compliance by States, direction for — Held, by permitting the plying Jugaad on road, in case of accident etc., the liability under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act may not be properly enforced — Prohibitory circular issued by Central Government dated 26th July, 2007 has not been complied by all states — Accordingly all states are impleaded suo motu and directed to file reply — Circulars dated 26th July, 2007, Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways.

(Paras 1 & 2)

Chairman, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Santosh [Bench Strength 2], SLP (C) No. 3265/2012 (13/04/2012), 2013(7) SCC 107 [B.S. Chauhan, J.: Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Patents Act, 1970 — Section 116 — Replacement of Technical Member — Nexus with one side of the dispute — Direction — Plea that Technical Member of IPAB had earlier field an affidavit in the matter taking a particular position in the dispute which has a direct bearing on the case, accordingly he should be directed for recusal with appointing a new Technical Member only for deciding the case — Held, in the facts and circumstances, Dr. P.C. Chakraborti, is selected from panel provided by Union of India who is currently Deputy Controller of Patents & Designs, and holds post-graduate degree of M.Sc. (Chemistry) as well as Ph.D. in place of Sh. S. Chandrasekaran in this case — While Mr. Chakraborti shall hold post as Member Technical shall get all remuneration as Member Technical but shall not be paid for his current post except seniority and other incidental benefits — Practice and Procedure — Recusal of interested member.

(Paras 5 to 7).

Natco Pharma Limited v. Union of India [Bench Strength 2], Civil Appeals Nos. 6004-18/2008 (01/10/2008), 2013(7) SCC 241 [S.H. Kapadia, J.: B. Sudershan Reddy, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Patents Act, 1970 — Section 116 — Replacement of Technical Member — Nexus with one side of the dispute — Rationality of hearing by IPAB — Petition before IPAB for replacement of Technical Member in place of S. Chandrasekaran on the ground that the said Member had earlier filed an affidavit in the matter taking a particular position in the dispute which has a direct bearing on the case in hand — Held, such complicated issue need not be resolved by IPAB.

(Para 3 & 4)

Natco Pharma Limited v. Union of India [Bench Strength 2], Civil Appeals Nos. 6004-18/2008 (01/10/2008), 2013(7) SCC 241 [S.H. Kapadia, J.: B. Sudershan Reddy, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Constitution of India — Article 129 — Contempt petition — Instituted suppressing material facts — Non-disclosure of material proceeding — Held, petitioner being an Government Corporation filed contempt petition file contempt petition suppressing material facts, is highly misconceived and dismissed with cost of Rs. Rs.50,000/- — Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Sections 2(a) & 14 — Practice and Procedure — Contempt suppressing material facts — Effect.

(Paras 1 to 4)

National Textile Corporation (Uttar Pradesh) Limited v. Bhim Sen Gupta [Bench Strength 4], Contempt Petition (C) No. 75/2005 in Transferred Case (C) No. 14/1987 (03/02/2006), 2013(7) SCC 416 [Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J.: C.K. Thakker, J.: R.V. Raveendran, J.: Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 439 — Bail — Before completion of investigation — CBI investigation against conspiracy — Objection of CBI that it was investigating without wasting of time and soon it had to file charge sheet — Held, no interference at this stage — Petitioner has liberty to renew his prayer for bail before Trial Court after filing of charge sheet — Penal Code, 1860 — Section 120-B.

Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. Central Bureau of Investigation Anti-Corruption Branch [Bench Strength 2], SLPs (Crl.) No. 5902/2012 with No. 5946/2012 (05/10/2012), 2013(7) SCC 450 [Aftab Alam, J.: Ranjana Prakash Desai, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>
ORDER

1. Taken on board. In view of the assertion made in the petition as well as the statement of Mr Ram Jethmalarn, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner regarding serious apprehension of the real likelihood of bias on the part of the Presiding Judge of the trial court and his approach in dealing with the matter, we are inclined to examine the issue.

2. Issue notice returnable on 23-7-2013.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner is permitted to serve notice on the Standing Counsel for the State of Jharkhand through the Central Bureau of Investigation. Dasti, in addition, is permitted. Till then there shall be stay of further proceedings in RC Case No. 20(A) of 1996 pending before the Special Judge IV, CBI (AHD), Ranchi, Tharkhand.

Lalu Prasad v. State of Jharkhand [Bench Strength 2], SLP (Crl.) No. 5513/2013 (09/07/2013), 2013(7) SCC 240 [P. Sathasivam, J.: J. Chelameswar, J.] <<LAWPACK SUPREME COURT>>

Entry Filed under: Admin